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ABSTRACT 
DINARA BAYAZITOVA: The Effect of Dealing in Securities on Lending at 
Commercial Banks 
(Under the direction of Anil Shivdasani) 
 
This study empirically examines the effect on lending of the change in bank regulation in 
1996, when commercial banks were allowed to increase their dealing in securities. It 
documents the decline in loan growth rates at the affected dealer banks compared to 
unaffected banks. In particular, affected banks restricted their supply of lending by 
increasing denial rates on mortgages after the change. These effects can be explained by 
the competition for limited funding between lending and dealing in securities in the 
presence of credit constraints. Also, this research demonstrates that dealer banks shift 
funds from lending to market-making during periods of high volatility. This occurs 
because of the increased demand for liquidity provision by market-makers. Consistent 
with this explanation, I find higher risk-adjusted gross trading returns at dealer banks at 
those times. 
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1.Introduction 
In this thesis I consider patterns of lending behavior by conglomerate banks that combine 
lending with dealing in securities. I analyze how lending by this kind of banks is different from 
lending by other commercial banks. Proprietary trading and dealing in securities by commercial 
banks is a controversial topic. One of the major points of the debate is how to distinguish 
between these two types of trading. Many academics and industry practitioners agree that there is 
no clear algorithm to implement such a distinction. Even more importantly, it may be 
conceptually impossible, since market making can be viewed as a form of proprietary trading 
(Duffie, 2012). If this is taken into account, one can expect that proposed restrictions on 
proprietary trading will limit market making. They might also have unintended consequences in 
the form of reduced liquidity and increased funding costs for bond issuers (Oliver Wyman, 
2011).  
In addition to its effect on bank risk and liquidity in financial markets, there is another 
dimension to the possible consequences of trading in securities by commercial banks: it may 
affect bank lending. And it is this effect that is the main focus of this empirical study. It is not 
well understood, despite recent attention to commercial banks that engage in both lending and 
trading. It is very important, however, for formulating a sound regulatory policy, given that 
dealer banks account for a large portion of total lending in the US. 
Trading in securities by commercial banks may have a negative effect on their lending. 
According to the bank regulatory rules, some minimum level of equity capital is required to be 
 
	  
2	  
allocated to both issued loans and trading assets held on balance sheets. When trading and 
lending divisions are combined in one financial institution, they compete for a limited amount of 
bank equity capital. Capital is costly, however, and if the expected risk-adjusted performance of 
lending is lower than that of trading, it may get less capital. Because trading at commercial banks 
is restricted and minimum capital requirements limit the opportunities for a bank to take risk, it 
will choose an optimal mix of lending and trading. If expected returns are non-linear, however, 
an internal rather than the corner solution will be chosen. 
As a way of resolving the issue of causality, I consider two exogenous shocks to dealing 
and examine their effects on lending at the affected banks. First, I look at the bank regulatory 
change of 1996 that relaxed the constraint on dealing by commercial banks. For a long time the 
Banking Act of 1933 (also known as the Glass-Steagall Act) prohibited commercial banks, with 
a few exceptions, from making markets in securities. This restriction was subsequently eroded by 
the Federal Reserve’s reinterpretations of its wording. In 1987 commercial banks were allowed 
to establish so called Section 20 subsidiaries that could engage in underwriting and dealing in 
securities to a limited extent. In 1996 this constraint was further relaxed. It is this later change in 
the rule that is used as an exogenous shock to examine the effect of dealing on lending in this 
thesis. To eliminate the contaminating influence of other events affecting both types of banks, I 
perform a difference-in-difference test. I find that after the constraint on dealing was relaxed, 
dealer banks reduced their loan growth compared to other banks not affected by the regulatory 
change. 
It is also important to understand what drives the decline in loan growth by dealer banks 
after the regulatory change: lower loan supply or decline in loan demand. To disentangle loan 
supply and demand effects, I estimate at the likelihood of loan applications being rejected and 
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compare the changes in this likelihood after 1996 between dealer and other banks. To perform 
this test I consider mortgage loans only, because this is the only category for which such detailed 
data is publicly available. I find that after 1996 dealer banks were more likely to reject mortgage 
applications than were other banks. In other words, dealer banks tightened their mortgage loan 
supply after the constraint on market making was relaxed. This result holds when I repeat the 
analysis for each of the ten largest US states separately to form a better match between affected 
and unaffected banks. Finally, to provide evidence in support of the supply-side explanation, I 
examine changes in loan demand around the bank regulatory change. I measure loan demand by 
the total number of mortgage applications submitted to a bank, and show that changes in 
mortgage demand was no different for dealer banks compared to others.  
I also examine alternative explanations for the decline in loan growth rate for dealer 
banks after the regulatory change. One can argue that loan demand has declined because 
commercial banks entered underwriting at the same time as dealing in securities. Although this 
could magnify the magnitude of the decline in corporate loans, it was unlikely to affect 
mortgages, for which I find tightening of credit supply as well. 
Another concern is that banks do not hold on their balance sheets only loans they have 
originated, but also securitized. Therefore, the decline in growth rates for loans held on bank 
balance sheets might be due to an overall upward trend in securitization, which is likely to affect 
larger banks more than smaller ones. However, we do not find support for this explanation, since 
there is no difference in changes in the fraction of securitized mortgages held by dealer and non-
dealer banks.  
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Increase in demand for dealing on capital markets during high-volatility periods is 
considered the second exogenous shock. Asset pricing literature suggests that at periods of high 
uncertainty, demand for dealing is particularly strong. There are both theoretical reasons and 
empirical evidence of this effect. So called flight to quality usually arises at these times, and 
requires market-makers to provide liquidity. Also, investors tend to increase their hedging 
demands at those times as well. Selling pressure is further amplified by a number of frictions 
discussed in the asset pricing literature. In particular, fund managers are subject to withdrawals 
when fund performance falls below a threshold (Vayanos, 2004). Traders liquidate holdings 
across different securities after trading losses (Kyle & Xiong, 2001). There is a positive relation 
between volatility and trading volume for different types of assets (Gallant, Rossi & Tauchen, 
1992; Foster, 1995; Wang and Yau, 2000; Fleming 2003). As a result of these frictions, at 
periods of high uncertainty financial institutions that combine lending and dealing under one 
umbrella are likely to have incentives to move funds from lending to dealing. 
The empirical evidence that I provide is consistent with this hypothesis. High-volatility 
periods are defined as the quarters when the average daily VIX was in the top 25% of quarters 
since the beginning of the VIX series in 1990. I find that during these periods banks have 
abnormally high risk-adjusted gross trading returns, suggesting that they do have incentives to 
move funds from lending to dealing. I also show that during periods of high volatility, growth 
rates in trading assets increase while loan growth rates decrease for these banks relative to others. 
This suggests that dealer banks do shift funds from lending to dealing at these times. 
I consider and reject some alternative explanations for these findings. First, I show that 
the lower growth rate in loans by dealer banks during high-volatility periods is not due to the 
overlap between recession and high-volatility quarters, or to a higher sensitivity of these banks to 
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recessions. Second, I show that the result cannot be explained by high reliance of these banks on 
financing from capital markets, which tend to dry up during periods of high volatility. 
The findings of this thesis have important implications for bank regulation. Most 
importantly, combining lending and market-making may divert funds from lending and is likely 
to lower loan growth. At periods of high volatility this effect is likely to be amplified.  
However, it is also possible that higher profits from market-making may compensate for 
abnormally high credit losses, thus supporting bank capital when recessions are accompanied by 
high volatility on capital markets. Banks with higher levels of capital are likely to lend more. 
Therefore, profits from market-making may indirectly increase lending in later periods. In other 
words, market-making can potentially subsidize lending through diversification of bank earnings. 
Although these indirect positive effects of trading on lending are possible, they are difficult to 
measure, and I do not provide supporting evidence in this thesis. 
This thesis contributes to the literature on trading in securities by commercial banks. The 
majority of the earlier papers have focused on the effect of trading in securities on bank risk. 
Their findings are mixed because of the different methodologies and sample periods used. 
Studies from the 1980s find that overall commercial bank risk is lower in the presence of trading. 
This is an example of a classic diversification effect that arises when two types of activities are 
combined, and conditional on their earnings being less than perfectly correlated. Wall and 
Eisenbeis (1984) consider combined earnings of banks and securities firms at the industry level. 
White (1986) finds that banks trading in securities had higher survival rates than others during 
the Great Depression. Kwast (1989) finds some potential for diversification gains from limited 
securities activities under the Glass-Steagall Act. However, he cautions that this potential 
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appears to be limited. Later studies find an increase in overall bank risk after the Glass-Steagall 
Act was repealed (Geyfman & Yeager, 2009) and for Section 20 subsidiaries using their 
confidential financial statements (Kwan, 1998). DeYoung and Roland (2001) analyze the reasons 
for higher volatility of earnings from trading than from lending. They suggest that in contrast to 
lending, trading has low switching costs (relationships are not as important as they are in 
lending) and high operating leverage (the competitive salaries of traders are a large fixed 
expense). None of these papers, however, considered the effect of trading on lending, the focus 
of this study. 
The findings of this thesis are relevant for the current discussion of the so-called Volcker 
rule, one of the most intensely debated parts of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Johnson, 2012). The Volcker rule constrains trading by commercial 
banks and is intended to limit risk-taking in the banking sector that is financed to a large extent 
through FDIC insured deposits. The Volcker rule limits proprietary trading and investments in 
hedge funds by commercial banks to 3% of bank capital, but allows them to trade “on behalf of 
customers” (to make markets). Although this rule applies only to proprietary trading and does 
not restrict dealing in securities, it is reasonable to argue that it might affect lending as well, 
because the two types of trading are difficult to distinguish. 
This thesis is organized as follows. In Section 2, the data and sample construction are 
described. In Section 3 the effect of regulatory change on lending by dealer banks is considered. 
In Section 4 the incentives in lending and market-making during periods of high volatility are 
considered. In Section 5 the findings are summarized. 
2. Data 
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Banks dealers are bank holding companies (BHCs) that have established so-called Section 20 
subsidiaries. The list of these banks is compiled on the basis of the approval decisions for 
establishing Section 20 subsidiaries obtained from the Federal Reserve Bulletins. As of the end 
of the second quarter of 1995, 25 BHCs in US had established Section 20 subsidiaries. These 
banks are listed in Appendix A. The subsample of nondealers consists of 1,082 bank holding 
companies, including 398 public banks.  
Bank financial statements data are obtained from Y-9C Reports (the Bank Holding Company 
Report of Income and Report of Condition) for the years from 1995 until 2008. Table 1 shows 
summary statistics on the major characteristics of dealer banks that are used as control variables 
in regressions later. Chargeoffs on loans as a percentage of total loans on bank balance sheet are 
used as a proxy for credit losses. The percentage of total assets financed with deposits shows the 
composition of funding. 
Loan balances at dealer banks grew on average 1.07% per quarter in 1995–2008. The median 
growth rate was slightly higher at 1.23%. As of the end of the second quarter of 1995, banks with 
Section 20 subsidiaries had on average $81.7 billion in total assets. They had 62.3% of their 
assets invested in loans and 5.3% in trading assets. Credit losses were on average 0.11% of total 
loans. 57.3% of total assets were funded with deposits.  
Data on mortgage loan applications and originations comes from the HMDA dataset. This is 
collected by the Federal Reserve under the provisions of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
(HMDA), which was enacted in 1975 to monitor mortgage market access for minority and low-
income borrowers. The HMDA requires all regulated financial institutions with assets above $30 
million to provide information. This dataset is therefore a comprehensive source of information 
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about mortgages. Refinancings are excluded from the sample. Among other things, the HMDA 
dataset contains information about the amount of loan for which each application was made, the 
year of application, and an indicator for the bank decision. The date when the mortgage 
application was made is not included. Therefore, 1995 and 1997 are included for the analysis (a 
year before and a year after the 1996 regulatory change). The average denial rate of mortgage 
applications for dealer banks in this sample period was 29%. 
3. Exogenous Shock I: Regulatory Change in 1996 
3.1 Bank regulation of dealing in securities in the US 
Trading in securities by commercial banks is a highly controversial topic and government 
regulation of this issue has been different at different points in time. According to the 1933 
Glass-Steagall Act, commercial banks were prohibited from underwriting and dealing in 
securities. Government and general municipal bonds were the exceptions to this rule. All other 
types of securities were considered to be bank ineligible. However, there was a loophole in the 
formulation of the law. According to the Glass-Steagall Act commercial banks could not “be 
engaged principally” in underwriting and dealing of securities. Unfortunately, the language of 
the law did not specify more precisely what it means “to be engaged principally”. This restriction 
was gradually eroded in the late 1980s, when the Federal Reserve reinterpreted the meaning of 
“to be engaged principally”. In 1987 it ruled that commercial banks could establish separate 
subsidiaries to underwrite and deal in securities. If revenues from underwriting and dealing in 
bank ineligible securities account for no more than 5% of the total revenue of the subsidiary, the 
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subsidiary is considered to be not “engaged principally” in these activities.1 This cutoff level was 
later increased to 10% in 1989 and to 25% in 1996. Bank subsidiaries engaged in underwriting 
and dealing in previously bank-ineligible securities were called Section 20 subsidiaries after the 
section of the Glass-Steagall Act that originally prohibited it, but was later reinterpreted by the 
Federal Reserve. 
3.2 Hypothesis I: Competition between lending and dealing for funding 
These regulatory changes have led to the creation of financial institutions in which lending 
and dealing in securities are combined. The patterns of growth and financing of both types of 
activity within such institutions are likely to be different from those at standalone banks.  
At such financial institutions the headquarters redistribute profits as well as externally raised 
funds among the divisions based on their risk-adjusted performance. If expected returns adjusted 
for risk are larger for a dealing division than for a lending division, a bank’s management will 
have incentives to shift funds from lending to dealing.  
 
In principle, a bank might prefer to raise new capital to expand into dealing activities, and 
would not necessarily have to reduce lending. However, it is important to keep in mind that 
raising new capital involves transaction costs. In other words, the opportunities for banks to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Although a bank can increase trading in ineligible securities at any cutoff level if it increases trading in eligible 
securities at the same time, it is easier to do with a higher cutoff because, for example,  the supply of Treasuries is 
limited or because buying too many Treasuries will have an effect on price.   
Hypothesis 1 
If a bank holding company is financially constrained, lending and market making 
divisions compete for limited funding. When market-making at a bank holding company 
increases, its loan growth is reduced. 
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expand are limited. To choose an optimal growth strategy, bank management needs to evaluate 
the tradeoff between the expected returns and risks in dealing and the costs of raising new 
capital. Specific reasons for the decision might vary across banks, but there are some general 
arguments that apply to all of them. 
Most importantly, to value bank assets, outside investors need detailed information about the 
assets held on the bank’s balance sheet. As with nonfinancial companies, the data contained in 
the publically available financial statements is aggregated. More detailed additional information 
provided to analysts and investors during public offerings might be interpreted in various ways. 
Some types of bank assets are intrinsically complicated and difficult to value. Also, the rules 
regulating valuation of some types of bank assets are often opaque and difficult to understand. 
This presents challenges for commercial banks in raising external capital. Diamond (1984) 
argues that financial intermediation gives rise to an additional layer of agency problems and 
creates a need “to monitor the monitor”. 
Also in contrast to loans, trading assets on the balance sheets of dealer banks are marked to 
market. The consequences of mark-to-market accounting for trading assets is a question that was 
debated in the literature for a long time. With mark-to-market accounting, reporting transparency 
of bank shares is reduced, because marking to market for trading assets occurs at higher 
frequency. The reasons for this effect are discussed in Ball, Jayaraman and Shivakumar (2012). 
First, bank managers convey private information to uninformed investors by issuing voluntary 
earnings forecasts. Because gains and losses on trading assets are difficult to predict, mark-to-
market accounting for trading assets makes it more difficult for bank managers to convey their 
private information credibly while making these forecasts. Second, uninformed investors are at a 
disadvantage in determining the extent to which securities’ gains and losses are due to shocks to 
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expected returns (which reverse in earnings over time) or shocks to expected cash flows, or both. 
Third, it is possible that managers manipulate mark-to-market gains and losses on trading 
securities by selectively trading in illiquid markets and influencing traded prices (Heaton et al., 
2010; Milbradt, 2009). There is evidence of price manipulation at the end of period: increases in 
trading volumes, widening of spreads and subsequent price reversals. For example, Carhart et al. 
(2002) find that about 80% of mutual funds outperform the S&P 500 on the last trading day of 
the year, and more than 60% under-perform the next day. Gallagher et al. (2009) and Comerton-
Forde and Putniņš (2011) provide evidence of price manipulations in other contexts.  
Literature on the financial constraints on non-financial firms suggested a number of ways of 
measuring them, with investment-cash flow sensitivity being the most commonly used (Fazzari 
et al., 1988). Hadlock and Pierce (2010) provide a critical review of this literature, and conclude 
that measures based on a single firm characteristic, such as size and age, are superior predictors 
of financial constraint levels.  
Applying this method to commercial banks, however, does not allow us to conclude that they 
are financially constrained, and there are reasons to argue that it might not be applicable in this 
context. In particular, commercial banks are financed with FDIC insured deposits and are also 
subject to minimum capital requirements. This distorts any decisions made by banks compared to 
those of non-financial firms, including rules regarding investments. Also there are a few other 
regulatory restrictions that impair the ability of bank holding companies to manage their capital 
on a consolidated basis. The Federal Reserve imposes minimum capital requirements not only on 
holding companies, but also on the individual subsidiaries that comprise them. It is important 
that the holding company is viewed as a source of strength to its subsidiaries. In other words, the 
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holding company has an obligation to downstream capital to inadequately capitalized 
subsidiaries.  
3.3 Exogenous shock I: The regulatory change of 1996 
Although we would like to recreate the decision-making process of bank managers, given the 
limited level of detail in the available data, it is not feasible to reconstruct this process. However, 
the regulatory change described above can be viewed as an exogenous shock and used as a basis 
for a test.  
The regulatory change of 1996 relaxed the constraint on market-making for dealer banks. It 
is reasonable to suggest that this encouraged a shift of growth in the affected banks from lending 
to dealing, from which they had previously been restricted. This was likely to lead to a decline in 
the lending growth rates in this group relative to other banks.  
As described above, the revenue limit for Section 20 subsidiaries was changed twice after it 
was introduced in 1987. Although each of these regulatory changes could potentially be a basis 
for a test, only the last (the increase in the revenue limit from 10% to 25% proposed in July 
1996) is suitable for this purpose, for the following two reasons. First, the majority of Section 20 
subsidiaries were established between 1987 and 1989. Therefore, it is difficult to disentangle the 
effects of the 1987 and 1989 regulatory changes in revenue limit for these banks. Second, the  
1996 increase was the largest of the three. Therefore, one would expect the effect of this change 
to be the strongest.  
I test this empirical prediction using two types of data: bank financial statements in which 
loans are aggregated at bank holding company level, and mortgage application data collected 
according to the HMDA.  
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3.4 Changes in loan growth after the regulatory change of 1996 
First, I perform difference-in-difference tests with data on the total amount of loans held on 
bank balance sheets. I calculate the abnormal growth rate in loans for each dealer bank as the 
difference between the quarterly growth in its loan balances and the median quarterly growth in 
loan balances in the comparison group. Two comparison groups of banks are used: all bank 
holding companies, and public-only bank holding companies. After calculating the abnormal 
growth rates in loans for dealer banks, I compare them for the periods before and after the 
regulatory change. To minimize the contaminating effect of other events, the sample is restricted 
to the time period starting four quarters before and ending four quarters after the July 1996 
change in revenue limit. Banks-quarters in which acquisitions are completed are excluded from 
the sample.  
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the average abnormal growth rate in loans for dealer banks 
declined in the four quarters after the regulatory change compared to the four quarters before. 
The magnitude of the decline in abnormal loan growth rate (-1.03%) is economically significant 
compared to the average growth rate of 2.5% in the total sample during this period. Analysis of 
medians leads to a similar conclusion: the regulatory change of July 1996 was followed by a 
statistically and economically significant decline in the loan growth rate. The magnitude of the 
median decline is large compared to the median growth rate of loans (2.2%) in the total sample 
during this period. This result holds if the subsample of public bank holding companies is used 
as a comparison group of banks, as shown in the second half of Panel A of Table 2. 
To ensure that the negative abnormal growth in loans does not simply reflect changes in total 
assets, but represents a shift away from loans at dealer banks, I next perform a difference-in-
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difference test for the changes in the ratio of loans to total assets. Panel B of Table 2 shows that 
when measured this way, loans at dealer banks declined after the regulatory change in both 
means and medians. 
I also conduct a regression analysis of changes in loan growth at dealer banks to ensure that 
the decline in means and medians is not driven by other bank characteristics. As with the 
univariate tests, I restrict the sample to the time period starting four quarters before and ending 
four quarters after the July 1996 change in the revenue limit. An indicator variable Post 1996 is 
defined for four quarters after the regulatory change. An indicator variable Dealer is defined for 
the group of banks that established Section 20 subsidiaries as of June 30, 1995. The major 
coefficient of interest in this regression is the interaction term of these two indicator variables 
Post 1996 * Dealer. 
In column 1 of Table 3 the coefficient before the interaction term Post 1996 * Dealer is 
negative and statistically significant at 5%. This suggests that even after controlling for other 
bank characteristics, dealer banks had a lower growth rate in loans than non-dealer banks. At the 
same time, the growth rate in loans in the total sample is positive, as suggested by the positive 
coefficient on the indicator Post 1996. Larger banks have on average lower growth rate in loans. 
As one would expect, banks with more credit losses tend to increase their loan portfolio more 
slowly. In column 2 I include bank fixed effect to control for any time-invariant omitted 
variables. The coefficient for the interaction term Post 1996 * Dealer remains significant at 10%, 
and has similar magnitude. Both magnitudes are close to the mean and median abnormal growth 
rates from the univariate tests. In columns 3 and 4 I repeat the regressions for a smaller 
subsample of public bank holding companies and get similar conclusions.  
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I also conduct a similar test for the regulatory change in 1989. However, I do not find a 
similar effect there. This could be for the reasons explained above (the majority of Section 20 
subsidiaries were established between 1987 and 1989 and the magnitude of increase in the 
threshold in 1989 was small relative to that of 1996). 
3.5 Aggregate lending implications of the regulatory change of 1996 
Although we find that abnormal loan growth rates of dealer banks declined after the 
regulatory change of 1996 compared those of non-dealers, it is likely that borrowers rejected by 
dealer banks received loans from non-dealer banks competing in the same geographic region. 
However, this substitution may be incomplete. To estimate the net effect of the regulatory 
change on lending, the dollar amounts of growth in loan balances (rather than percentages) for 
dealer and non-dealer banks are summed up as follows: 
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where ND – the number of non-dealer banks 
      D – the number of dealer banks 
    itLΔ  – change in loan balances at a bank i in quarter t (in $) 
In the subsample of public banks only, the total effect of the regulatory change on lending 
growth is estimated to be -$20 billion. In the sample of all bank holding companies it is $2.5 
billion. None of private banks in the sample are dealers, and showed a positive change in average 
growth rate in loan balances, so compensating for the negative effect at public banks. These 
estimates of the effect in dollar terms are not economically significant compared to the amount 
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of total lending. In other words, when measured in dollar terms rather than in percentages, the 
conclusions are quite different. This might be explained by the fact that banks of different size 
had different growth rates in loans. 
3.6 What drives reduction in loan growth: demand or supply? 
Another interesting/important question is whether this change is driven by lower loan 
demand or tighter loan supply. As a way to disentangle these two effects I look at more detailed 
data on mortgage loan applications. This data makes it possible to model the probability of an 
application being denied by a bank, controlling for borrower, lender and geographic area 
characteristics. This has two purposes. First, mortgage application denial rates capture the supply 
side of lending, i.e. the willingness of lenders to make loans. Examining mortgage application 
denial rates, I can ensure that the decline in loan growth rates documented in the previous tables 
is not driven by a decline in demand. Second, this provides an independent robustness check of 
the result documented using aggregate amounts of loans from bank financial statements.  
HMDA data on mortgage applications is matched to the major dataset by the name and state 
of banks that are included in a Bank Holding Company. Linear probability models are estimated 
despite the fact that the dependent variable is an indicator variable, for which a probit model 
seems to be more suitable following Puri, Rocholl and Steffen (2011). The major reason for 
using this approach is that bank fixed effect should be included in these regressions to remove 
the effect of time-invariant omitted variables and alleviate the endogeneity problem. However, 
nonlinear models suffer from an incidental parameter problem, i.e. the fixed effects and the 
coefficients of the other variables cannot be consistently estimated in large but narrow panels 
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(with the number of time periods fixed and the number of groups growing infinitely).2 In 
contrast, in linear models the coefficients of the main explanatory variables can be estimated 
consistently. The results are robust to using logit as an alternative estimation method, as 
described below in more detail. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A in Table 4 show the estimates of the linear probability models 
for the subsample of public banks. The sample period includes one year before and after the 
regulatory change of July 1996 (1995 and 1997). The dependent variable is set to one if a 
mortgage application was rejected by a bank and to zero if the loan was granted. The interaction 
term between the indicator for the Section 20 bank and the indicator for the period after the 
regulatory change of 1996 is positive and significant at 1% level. The denial rate of mortgage 
applications at these banks increased after the regulatory change. In other words, mortgage 
underwriting standards at these banks became stricter. This is consistent with lower loan growth 
rates in the tests that used data on loans from bank financial statements. The magnitude of the 
effect is significant not only statistically but also economically. After the regulatory change, 
dealer banks had a 6% higher denial rate. It is almost one quarter of the average denial rate in the 
sample of 29%. 
In these regressions I control for a few applicant, bank and geographic area characteristics. 
As a measure of creditworthiness, applicant income is used. Although this is only one component 
of the credit scores typically used as a proxy for creditworthiness, credit score data is 
unfortunately prohibitively expensive. The coefficient before the logarithm of applicant income 
is negative and significant in all specifications. This is consistent with the intuition that higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Neyman and Scott (1948) show that the incidental parameters (fixed effects) become inconsistent in logit models 
as their number increases, while the amount of information about each parameter remains fixed.  
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income applicants have higher chances of being approved for a mortgage loan. Banks with a 
higher fraction of assets financed by deposits have higher denial rates. This result might reflect 
the conservativeness of a bank in both lending and funding. In column 2 a number of 
demographic characteristics of the geographic region in which an applicant lives are added. 
These are considered at the county level. The signs of the coefficients for these variables are 
consistent with expectations; applicants living in the counties with higher than average 
household income have lower denial rates, while those in the counties with a higher percentage 
of residents educated to less than college level have higher denial rates. 
Fitting a linear probability model for an indicator variable can be questioned because it can 
predict values that are negative or outside the range (0;1). For this reason, probit specifications 
are commonly used to model binary data. However, as discussed above, linear probability model 
has an important advantage for panel data. In contrast to a probit model, it provides consistent 
estimates of the main explanatory variables in models with firm fixed effects. As a robustness 
check of the previous result, the coefficients for probit models with and without bank fixed 
effects are shown in columns 3–6. The interaction terms between the dealer bank indicator and 
the indicator for the post-1996 period as well as control variables retain their sign and 
significance in all four specifications. 
To get a better comparison group for the group of banks under study, I also estimate separate 
models for the probability of mortgage denial for the ten largest US states. Banks operating in 
the same state are subject to similar economic and demographic conditions, as well as the same 
regulation. For example, whether a mortgage is no-recourse, so that the bank does not pursue a 
borrower to get the difference between the amount of the mortgage and the value of the house in 
case of foreclosure, is determined by the laws at the state level. Specification 2 from Panel A of 
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Table 4 is used to fit linear probability models with bank fixed effects for each state. Panel B of 
Table 4 shows the estimates of the coefficients before the interaction term between the bank-
dealer indicator and Post 1996 indicator. Eight out of ten states have positive and statistically 
significant coefficients for this interaction term. The fact that bank-dealer denial rates did not 
increase in California can be explained by the fact that many Internet and high-tech companies 
are located there and that 1997 was a year of the Dotcom boom. 
Finally, as an additional robustness check, loan level HMDA data is aggregated up to the 
bank level and linear regression models for bank average denial rate on mortgage applications 
for a given year is fit. Coefficients of this estimation are shown in Panel C of Table 4. They 
confirm the results obtained above for both all bank holding companies and the subsample of 
public ones only: dealer banks were more likely to deny mortgage applications after the 1996 
regulatory change. 
3.7 Which types of borrowers experience a reduction in credit availability? 
It is not obvious which types of borrowers experienced most of the reduction in credit 
availability after the change in regulation: those who were more or less creditworthy. Less 
creditworthy borrowers can be charged a higher interest rate, although such loans might lead to 
larger expected losses. To choose the optimal mix of loans, a bank needs to evaluate the risk-
return tradeoff. Borrower creditworthiness is usually measured by credit scores. However, the 
HMDA dataset does not include this variable. To overcome this data limitation, borrower income 
reported in HMDA is used.  
The total sample is split into two parts: borrowers with higher and lower than the median 
income. Table10 shows the results of the estimation of linear probability and probit models for 
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these two subsamples. Most importantly, the interaction term Post 96 * Dealer has significantly 
positive coefficients in both subsamples (except for the probit models without fixed effects in the 
subsample of high-income borrowers). This suggests that both groups of borrowers were affected 
by the regulatory changes. As might be expected, the magnitude of the effect was slightly greater 
for low-income borrowers. However, an important limitation of this analysis is that this 
conclusion is based on a specific measurement (income) that is only one component of the credit 
scores that are typically used by measure borrower creditworthiness.  
3.8 Alternative explanations 
It is reasonable to suggest that Section 20 banks securitized a large fraction of their loans and 
that the fraction of loans they securitized went up over time. Even if the amount of all originated 
loans was not affected, increase in the extent of securitization resulted in the reduction of the 
growth rate for loans held on bank balance sheets. To rule out this alternative explanation, the 
dynamics of securitization rates around 1996 at dealer and non-dealer banks need to be 
compared. HMDA mortgage loan data includes information about whether a loan was kept by a 
bank on its balance sheet or sold after the origination into securitization pools. An indicator for 
securitization is defined on the basis of this information. 
Table 5 shows the estimates of linear regression models with the percentage of all granted 
loans being securitized or sold by the originator in a given year as a dependent variable. The 
sample period includes one year before and after the regulatory change of July 1996. The 
interaction term between the indicator for the Section 20 bank and that for the period after the 
regulatory change of 1996 is negative and significant at a level of 10%. This means that the 
securitization rate of mortgage applications at these banks did not increase but, in contrast, went 
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down in 1997. This suggests that the lower growth rate in dealer banks after the regulatory 
change was not due to higher securitization rates at these banks. 
4. Exogenous Shock II: Intensified Capital Market Frictions during Periods of High 
Uncertainty 
4.1. Incentives in market-making during periods of high uncertainty 
As discussed in the first part, when market-making and lending are combined in one 
financial institution, they compete for funding, so that such financial institutions exhibit different 
lending patterns than others. To study these spillover effects in a time series context, I consider 
periods when uncertainty about the future increases exogenously. It is reasonable to expect that 
capital market frictions intensify at these periods. The effect of market-making on lending may 
therefore be particularly pronounced because it becomes especially difficult for a bank to raise 
new financing on capital markets. And it is during these periods that market-making by a 
financial institution may have particularly pronounced effects on its lending.  
However, it is important to note that intensified capital market frictions form a necessary, 
though not a sufficient, condition for market-making to affect lending. It is crucial that the bank 
headquarters have incentives to redistribute funding away from lending towards market-making. 
There are a number of arguments why the demand for market-making is likely to change during 
periods of high uncertainty, and how this change affects the incentives of the market-making 
division. Asset pricing literature suggests that at periods of high uncertainty on capital markets, 
demand for market-making is particularly strong. After negative shocks to the markets it is 
common to observe so called flight to quality, in which investors sell riskier assets and buy 
Treasuries. Market-makers are crucial in accommodating this selling pressure. Demand for 
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liquidity provision increases at these periods, and selling pressure is further amplified by a 
number of frictions discussed in asset pricing literature. Traders liquidate positions across 
different securities after trading losses (Kyle & Xiong, 2001). When fund performance falls 
below a threshold, fund managers are subject to withdrawals (Vayanos, 2004). Increase in 
hedging demands by investors is another reason for the increase in trading volume. In addition to 
these mostly theoretical arguments, there are also evidence of a positive relation between 
volatility and trading volume in the empirical asset pricing literature. Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen 
(1992) show that large price movements in equity prices are followed by high volume. Fleming 
(2003) reports positive time series correlation between volatility and trading volume for US 
Treasuries, which make up the largest segment of bond markets in terms of trading activity 
(according to FISMA, Treasuries represent about 60% of trading volume in all bonds). Foster 
(1995) finds that volatility and volume in the oil futures markets are positively 
contemporaneously related. Wang and Yau (2000) find positive relation between volatility and 
trading volume for futures on S&P 500, Deutsche Mark, silver and gold.3  
As a consequence of increased demand, return on liquidity provision increases during 
periods of high uncertainty. Dealers set wider bid-ask spreads to compensate for the increase in 
inventory risk borne by a market-maker (Ho & Stoll, 1983). Nagel (2011) shows that return from 
reversal strategies is higher when VIX is higher. Fleming (2003) finds a positive correlation 
between price volatility and bid-ask spreads in US Treasuries. Chordia, Sarkar and 
Subrahmanyam (2005) find that volatility is informative in predicting bid-ask spreads for stocks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 In addition to the findings of the previous literature in undocumented results I show that if I use our specific 
definition of high-volatility periods, trading volume is higher for two types of assets with long enough time series of 
data available (stock and exchange-traded derivatives). 
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and US Treasuries. Wang and Yau (2000) document a positive relation between volatility and 
bid-ask spread for a number of futures (S&P 500, Deutsche Mark, silver and gold). 
Because the demand for liquidity provision on capital markets increases at periods of 
high uncertainty, shifting funds from lending to this activity is a feasible and likely strategy for 
dealer banks. It is important to acknowledge, however, that at these periods the risks of market-
making also increase. 
 
 
 
I describe the empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis below. Most 
importantly, at the periods of high uncertainty the following holds for dealer banks: (1) higher 
risk-adjusted trading returns; (2) increase in trading assets; (3) decline in loan growth rate 
compared to non-dealers. High uncertainty periods are defined as quarters when the average 
daily VIX is in the top 25% for the period from the beginning of the series in 1990 until 2008. As 
a robustness check, I also use a 20% cutoff. The list of high-volatility quarters for 25% cutoff 
includes the following events: 
§ Asian crisis (Q7, 1997) 
§ LTCM (Q3 1998–Q3 1999) 
§ Dotcom bubble (Q3 2000–Q4 2001)  
§ Worldcom bankruptcy (Q3 2002–Q1 2003) 
§ Subprime crisis (Q1, Q3–Q4 2008) 
Hypothesis II 
At the periods of high volatility dealer banks shift funds away from lending to market making 
because of increased demand for market making.  
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4.2. Trading returns and trading assets of dealer banks in high uncertainty periods 
To provide evidence on the second hypothesis about bank incentives switching from 
lending to market making during the high uncertainty periods, I compare the risk-adjusted gross 
trading returns of dealer banks in high- and low-volatility quarters. Two measures of trading 
returns are used. Marked-to-Market Risk-Adjusted Return, % is the ratio that has in the 
numerator trading revenues per $1 of trading assets (the ratio of marked-to-market trading 
revenues [item BHCK A220] to the amount of trading assets at the beginning of the quarter). The 
denominator adjusts for risk to account for the fact that dealers might be compensated by higher 
returns for taking more risk at the periods of high volatility. As a measure of riskiness of trading 
assets I use Value at Risk (VaR) [item BHCK 1651] per unit of trading assets that all banks with 
a trading position exceeding $1 billion or 10% of total assets are required to report. As a result, I 
get a measure similar to the Sharpe ratio by dividing trading revenue per $1 of trading assets by 
VaR per $1 of trading assets. Another measure, Total Risk-Adjusted Return, %, includes not only 
marked-to-market trading revenue, but also interest income from trading assets [BHCK 4069]. 
The sum of these two types of revenue per $1 of trading assets is divided by VaR per $1 of 
trading assets to get the second measure of trading returns. Because of the limited information 
provided in BHC financial statements it is possible to calculate only gross returns, which do not 
take into account the costs of trading (most importantly funding costs and overhead expenses). 
Panel A of Table 6 shows that both measures of gross risk-adjusted trading returns at 
dealer banks are higher in high volatility periods than in low volatility periods. The difference in 
marked-to-market returns is statistically significant at 5% and economically large (mean: 1.2%, 
median: 0.74%) compared to the level of gross trading returns at low-volatility periods (mean: 
3.51%, median: 2.45%). The results are even stronger for the second measure: the difference in 
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total returns between high- and low-volatility periods is statistically significant at 1% level and 
economically large (mean: 1.42%, median: 2.27%) compared to the level of total returns at low-
volatility periods (mean: 6.23%, median: 4.43%). The right side of Panel A of Table 4 shows that 
the result is robust to the change in cutoff for a definition of high-volatility periods, although 
statistical significance is weaker, perhaps because of the smaller number of observations in the 
high-volatility subsample. These results suggest that dealer banks do have incentives to shift 
funds to market-making during high-uncertainty periods because they receive higher risk-
adjusted trading returns at such times. 
I also examine empirically whether dealer banks shift funds to market-making. First, I 
consider whether dealer banks increase their trading- to total-assets ratio during high-volatility 
quarters. Since trading assets can be rather volatile, I use the average trading- to total-assets ratio 
in the previous four quarters as a benchmark for comparison. I calculate Abnormal Trading 
Assets, % as a percentage change in the ratio of trading assets to total assets relative to the bank 
average in the previous four quarters.  
Panel B of Table 6 shows that although trading assets were growing even during low-
volatility quarters, their average growth was significantly faster during high-volatility quarters. 
The difference is statistically significant at 1% level for both mean and median. This result also 
holds if the cutoff for high-volatility quarters is moved to 20% from 25%, as shown on the right 
side of Panel B in Table 6. This suggests that dealer banks do move funds to market-making 
during high-uncertainty periods. 
Some trading assets are often financed with trading liabilities that include short positions 
on securities. Although trading liabilities reduce overall financing needs, a bank still needs to 
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allocate equity capital for the gross amount of trading assets rather than trading assets net of 
liabilities. Since equity capital is the most expensive form of funding, there is therefore the 
greatest competition to obtain it. Consequently, in our tests focused on competition between 
bank divisions for equity capital, it makes sense to consider changes in total rather than net 
trading assets.  
4.3. Lending by dealer banks during high-uncertainty periods 
To study the effect of market-making on lending during periods of high volatility, I 
perform a difference-in-difference test for the growth rates in loans. For each quarter I calculate 
abnormal loan growth rates at dealer banks relative to non-dealers. I use two different 
comparison groups: all bank holding companies and public only bank holding companies. Then I 
compare abnormal loan growth rates for dealer banks at high- and low-volatility periods. Table 7 
shows that abnormal growth rates of loans were lower during high-volatility quarters than in 
low-volatility quarters. For all loans, the difference is statistically significant at 1% level. The 
magnitude of the average difference (-0.55%) is economically large. It is about half of the 
abnormal total loan growth rate for dealer banks during low-volatility periods (-1.0%) and about 
one fifth of the unadjusted loan growth rate in the total sample (2.5%). Similar conclusions can 
be made based on medians and with public BHCs used as a comparison group. The result holds 
for three out of four types of loans (corporate, residential and non-residential loans) considered 
separately. 
In Table 8 I conduct a multivariate analysis to ensure that lower loan growth rates at 
dealer banks in periods of high uncertainty are not driven by other bank characteristics. The 
major coefficient of interest is the interaction term of the indicator for high-uncertainty periods 
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with the indicator for dealer-banks High VIX * Dealer. In all four specifications of Table 8, this 
interaction term is significantly negative at 5% level. This suggests that even after controlling for 
other bank characteristics, dealer banks have a lower loan growth rate relative to non-dealer 
banks during periods of high uncertainty. The magnitude of the effect is similar to the magnitude 
in the univariate tests.  
The coefficients on other variables are consistent with expectations. Larger banks tend to 
have slower growth rates. Banks using more deposit financing and borrowing less on capital 
markets grow slower. Banks with higher credit losses are more conservative in lending and 
increase their loans more slowly.  
4.4. Alternative explanations 
Periods of high uncertainty are often (although not always) accompanied by recession in 
the real economy. For example, the LTCM crisis of 1998 did not lead to a recession in the US, 
although it caused a lot of turbulence on the financial markets, while high volatility in the capital 
markets in 2001 was accompanied by a recession. Previous literature has suggested mechanisms 
that can propagate financial shocks to generate recession in the real sector. One of them is the 
financial accelerator introduced by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). 
The major transmission channel in these models is the increase in agency costs of borrowing 
after a negative financial shock, leading to a reduction in borrower net worth or collateral. It is 
therefore important to ensure that lower loan growth at dealer banks during high-volatility 
periods is not simply driven by an overlap between high-volatility and recession quarters. 
 To study this question, I define an indicator variable NBER Recession for the quarters 
that the NBER identifies as periods of recession in the US. The sample period used in the paper, 
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1996–2008, includes two recessions: those of 2001 (from the second to the fourth quarter) and 
2008 (all four quarters). I also define the interaction of this indicator with the indicator for dealer 
banks. Comparison of column 2 with column 1 of Table 9 shows that the decline in lending by 
public banks was twice as large during the recessions. However, the interaction term High VIX * 
Dealer remains negative and significant, suggesting that lower growth in loans during high-
volatility periods is not driven by overlaps with recessions.  
Another concern one might have regarding the findings in this thesis is that dealer banks 
tend to rely on borrowing from capital markets as a source of funding, and it could be this 
funding difficulty (rather than presence of market-making divisions) that explains the reduction 
in lending by dealer banks during periods of high volatility. To rule out this alternative 
explanation, I include the interaction of the indicator for high-volatility periods and a variable 
characterizing the composition of bank financing. For this purpose I define two variables: 
percentage of deposit financing; and percentage of non-deposit borrowings including interbank 
loans, REPO, commercial papers, bonds, etc. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 9 show that even after 
inclusion of these interaction terms, the coefficient before High VIX * Dealer remains 
significantly negative. This suggests that non-dealer banks that borrow on capital markets do not 
reduce their lending at times of high volatility more than other banks, and our result is not driven 
only by difficulties in financing at dealer-banks during high-volatility periods. However, as is 
discussed above, difficulty in obtaining external financing is a necessary condition for internal 
capital markets to have pronounced effects.  
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5. Conclusion 
In this thesis I study the patterns of lending within financial institutions that combine 
mortgage lending with making markets in securities. In order to address the causality concerns, 
two exogenous shocks were used. In Section 3.3 it was shown that after the regulatory change of 
1996 affected dealer banks reduced their lending and rejected a larger portion of mortgage 
applications. In Section 4.2 it was demonstrated that during periods of high uncertainty on capital 
markets, dealer banks have incentives to shift funds away from lending and towards market 
making because of the higher demand for liquidity provision at such times. The major 
implication of these findings is that an increase in market making at a commercial bank can 
reduce loan growth, and that this effect is particularly pronounced during the high volatility 
periods. 
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Appendix A. Commercial Banks – Dealers in Securities 
This table shows the list of bank holding companies that had established Section 20 subsidiaries to underwrite and 
deal in securities as of June 30,1995. 
 Bank Holding Company Name 
1 Banc One Corp.  
2 Bank of Boston Corp. 
3 Bank South Corp. 
4 BankAmerica Corp. 
5 Barnett Banks, Inc.  
6 Chase Manhattan Corp. 
7 Chemical New York Corp. 
8 Citicorp 
9 CoreStates Financial Corp. 
10 Dauphin Deposit Corp. 
11 First Chicago Corp. 
12 First Interstate Bancorp 
13 First of America Bank Corp. 
14 First Union Corp. 
15 Fleet/Norstar Financial Group, Inc.  
16 Huntington Bancshares, Inc.  
17 JP Morgan & Co., Inc. 
18 Key Corp 
19 Mellon Bank Corp. 
20 National City Corp. 
21 NCNB Corp. (later NationsBank)  
22 Norwest Corp. 
23 PNC Financial Corp. 
24 SouthTrust Banks, Inc.  
25 SunTrust Banks, Inc. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Dealer Banks. 
Loan Growth Rate, % is the quarterly growth rates in bank loan balances at dealer banks in 1995–2008. All other 
bank characteristics are reported as of June 30, 1995. Credit Losses, % are charge-offs on loans expressed as a 
percentage of total loans on bank balance sheet. 
  Mean  Median  
   
Loan growth, % 1.07% 1.23% 
Total assets, $billion 81.7 66.6 
Loans, % total assets 62.3 67.1 
Trading assets, % total assets 5.3 0.3 
Credit losses, % total loans 0.11 0.11 
Deposits, % total assets 57.3 62.3 
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Table 2. Loan Growth at Dealer Banks after the Regulatory Change I: Difference-in-Difference 
Tests. 
Panel A shows abnormal quarterly growth rates in bank loan balances (in %) at dealer banks four quarters before 
and after the regulatory changes of July, 1996. Panel B shows abnormal quarterly growth rates in loans to total 
assets ratios at dealer banks four quarters before and after the regulatory changes of July, 1996. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
    Obs.  Mean  Median 
     
Panel A. Abnormal Growth in Loans, %. 
     
Comparison group: all BHCs    
 Before the regulatory change 70 -0.37 -0.13 
 After the regulatory change 70 -1.40 -1.50 
 Difference  -1.03** -1.37** 
     
Comparison group: public BHCs    
 Before the regulatory change 70 -0.36 -0.13 
 After the regulatory change 70 -1.40 -1.32 
 Difference  -1.04** -1.19** 
     
     
Panel B. Abnormal Growth in Loans / Total Assets, %. 
     
Comparison group: all BHCs    
 Before the regulatory change 70 0.89 0.51 
 After the regulatory change 70 -0.44 -0.54 
 Difference  -1.34** -1.05*** 
    
Comparison group: public BHCs    
 Before the regulatory change 70 0.91 0.59 
 After the regulatory change 70 -0.37 -0.47 
 Difference  -1.28** -1.06** 
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Table 3. Decline in Loan Growth at Dealer Banks after the Regulatory Change II: Regression 
Analysis. 
This table shows estimates of the coefficients for OLS regressions with quarterly growth rates in bank loan balances 
(%) as dependent variables. Sample period includes four quarters before and four quarters after the regulatory 
change of July 1996. Post 1996 is an indicator variable for four quarters after the regulatory change. Dealer is an 
indicator variable for banks that established Section 20 subsidiaries as of the end of the second quarter of 1995. 
Credit Losses, % are charge-offs on loans expressed as a percentage of total loans on bank balance sheet. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. p-values based on 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted and clustered by bank standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
  All BHCs   Public BHCs 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Post 1996 0.51*** 0.58***  0.57*** 0.74*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Post 1996 * dealer -1.26** -1.19*  -1.27** -1.41** 
 (0.027) (0.076)  (0.027) (0.021) 
Log (total assets) -0.09* -2.04***  -0.25*** -1.78** 
 (0.081) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.013) 
Credit losses, % -1.39*** -0.90***  -1.30*** -0.64* 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.082) 
Deposits, % -0.02** 0.03  -0.02* -0.01 
 (0.050) (0.393)  (0.086) (0.824) 
Dealer -0.15   0.27  
 (0.791)   (0.652)  
Fixed effect No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 8,892 8,892  3,146 3,146 
R squared 0.021 0.334  0.031 0.367 
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Table 4. Mortgage Application Denial Rates at Dealer Banks after the Regulatory Change	  
Panel A shows estimates of the linear probability models and probit models with the dependent variable equal to one 
if a mortgage application is denied by a bank and to zero if the loan is granted. Panel B reports coefficients of the 
interaction terms for linear probability models estimated separately for ten US states with the largest population. 
Control variables are the same as in the specification (2) of Panel A. Sample used in panels A and B includes only 
public bank holding companies and covers one year before and after the regulatory change of July 1996 (1995 and 
1997). Panel C shows estimates of OLS regressions with the bank average mortgage application denial rate as 
dependent variables. Post 1996 is an indicator variable for 1997, the year after the regulatory change. Dealer is an 
indicator variable for banks that established Section 20 subsidiaries before 1995. Credit Losses, % are charge-offs 
on loans expressed as a percentage of total loans on bank’s balance sheet. Median Income is the logarithm of the 
median household income in a county. Education is the percentage of population in the county with high school 
education. Minorities is the percentage of non-white population in a county. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. p-values based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted and clustered 
by census tract standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
Panel A. Probability of Mortgage Application Denial 
    LINEAR PROBABILITY   PROBIT 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
          
 Post 1996 0.00 0.00  0.21*** 0.18***  0.03 0.03 
  (0.929) (0.973)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.209) (0.266) 
 Dealer -0.38 -0.39  0.21*** 0.22***  0.32 0.09 
  (0.876) (0.989)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.337) (0.681) 
 Post 1996 * dealer 0.06*** 0.06***  0.15*** 0.10***  0.24*** 0.24*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 Log (income) -0.13*** -0.12***  -0.70*** -0.65***  -0.57*** -0.55*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 Log (total assets) 0.06*** 0.05***  0.01 0.01  0.12 0.10 
  (0.004) (0.010)  (0.445) (0.338)  (0.119) (0.198) 
 Deposits, % 0.54*** 0.53***  -1.50*** -1.41***  2.04*** 2.05*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 Credit losses, % -0.09*** -0.09***  -0.52*** -0.44***  -0.29*** -0.29*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 Log (median income)  -0.06***   -0.24***   -0.12** 
   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.023) 
 Education  0.00*   0.02***   0.01*** 
   (0.083)   (0.000)   (0.005) 
 Minorities  -0.00   -0.00   0.00 
   (0.734)   (0.870)   (0.456) 
 Fixed effect Yes Yes  No No  Yes Yes 
 Observations 915,982 915,982  915,982 915,982  915,719 915,719 
  R squared 0.238 0.239   0.155 0.164   0.222 0.223 
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Panel B. Probability of Mortgage Application Denial for 10 US States 
  State Post 1996 * Dealer p-value 
Observations 
(Number of  
applications)  
R-squared 
      
1 California -0.02 (0.521) 54,413 0.090 
2 Florida 0.11** (0.018) 87,911 0.091 
3 Georgia  -0.08*** (0.009) 35,595 0.460 
4 Illinois 0.14*** (0.000) 19,217 0.111 
5 Michigan 0.28*** (0.000) 35,096 0.207 
6 New York 0.09*** (0.007) 42,075 0.198 
7 North Carolina 0.09* (0.085) 56,049 0.408 
8 Ohio 0.05*** (0.000) 50,867 0.208 
9 Pennsylvania 0.10*** (0.000) 41,736 0.188 
10 Texas 0.12*** (0.003) 37,839 0.184 
            
 
Panel C. Determinants of the Bank’s Average Mortgage Application Denial Rate  
  All BHCs   Public BHCs 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Post 1996 -0.01 -0.00  0.01* 0.01** 
 (0.127) (0.497)  (0.087) (0.036) 
Dealer 0.05 0.05  0.03 0.04 
 (0.102) (0.124)  (0.224) (0.208) 
Post 1996 * Dealer 0.09*** 0.09***  0.07** 0.07** 
 (0.008) (0.006)  (0.045) (0.031) 
Log(Total Assets) 0.02*** 0.02***  0.03*** 0.02*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposits, % 0.15** 0.09*  0.21** 0.11 
 (0.016) (0.062)  (0.019) (0.115) 
Credit Losses, % 0.01 0.02*  -0.00 0.00 
 (0.209) (0.090)  (0.883) (0.579) 
Log(Av. Income)  -0.06***   -0.07*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000) 
Fixed Effect Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 1,300 1,300  619 619 
R squared 0.106 0.161   0.176 0.239 
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Table 5. Securitization Rates at Dealer Banks after the Regulatory Change	  
This table shows estimates of the OLS regressions with average bank securitization rates on mortgage applications 
as dependent variable. Securitization rate for each bank is defined as the ration of the amount of originated loans that 
were securitized or sold to the total amount of originated loans. Sample period includes years before and after the 
regulatory change (1995 and 1997). Post 1996 is an indicator variable for 1997, the year after the regulatory change. 
Dealer is an indicator variable for banks that established Section 20 subsidiaries before 1995. Credit Losses, % are 
charge-offs on loans expressed as a percentage of total loans on bank’s balance sheet. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. p-values based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted and 
clustered by bank standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
	    All BHCs   Public BHCs 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Post 1996 1.02 1.02  1.65 1.64 
 (0.305) (0.304)  (0.270) (0.275) 
Dealer 7.01 -0.41  5.89 1.66 
 (0.181) (0.949)  (0.272) (0.805) 
Post 1996 * Dealer -8.80* -9.04*  -9.43* -9.48* 
 (0.096) (0.091)  (0.082) (0.083) 
Log(Total Assets)  1.52*   1.16 
  (0.072)   (0.268) 
Deposits, %  -2.12   5.39 
  (0.859)   (0.678) 
Credit Losses, %  1.66   5.78 
  (0.614)   (0.331) 
      
Observations 1,195 1,195  570 570 
R squared 0.002 0.008  0.003 0.011 
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Table 6. Trading Returns and Trading Assets of Dealer Banks at High Uncertainty Periods 
Panel A shows quarterly risk-adjusted marked-to-market and gross trading returns for dealer banks during high and 
low VIX periods in 1996–2008. Marked-to-Market Risk-Adjusted Return,% is trading revenues per 1$ of trading 
assets divided by Value at Risk (VaR) per $1 of trading assets. Total Risk-Adjusted Return, % is the sum of trading 
revenues and interest income per $1 of trading assets divided by Value at Risk (VaR) per $1 of trading assets. Panel 
B shows Abnormal Trading Assets, % which are defined as the percentage change in the ratio of trading assets to 
total assets relative to the bank’s average of this ratio over the previous four quarters. High VIX is an indicator for 
the quarters in which average for the quarter daily VIX is in the top 25% or top 20% for the period from the 
beginning of the VIX series in 1990 until 2008. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
    High VIX  = Top 25%   High VIX  = Top 20% 
  Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median 
         
Panel A. Risk-Adjusted Gross Trading Returns     
         
   Marked-to-Market Risk-Adjusted Returns, % 
 High VIX 127 4.71 3.19  103 4.55 3.25 
 Low VIX 215 3.51 2.45  239 3.71 2.59 
 Difference  1.20** 0.74**   0.84* 0.66* 
        
   Total Risk-Adjusted Returns, % 
         
 High VIX 127 7.64 6.70  102 7.49 6.63 
 Low VIX 215 6.23 4.43  240 6.44 4.77 
 Difference  1.42*** 2.27***   1.05* 1.86** 
         
Panel B. Abnormal Trading Assets, %     
         
 High VIX 196 17.22 8.66  160 18.34 8.53 
 Low VIX 357 7.25 1.65  393 7.71 2.07 
 Difference  9.97*** 7.01***   10.63*** 6.46*** 
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Table 7. Lending by Dealer Banks at High Uncertainty Periods: Difference-in-Difference Tests 
This table shows abnormal quarterly growth rates in bank loan balances (%) at dealer banks during high and low 
VIX periods in 1996-2008. As a comparison group of banks all non-dealer BHCs and public non-dealer BHCs are 
used. High VIX is an indicator for the quarters in which the average for the quarter daily VIX is in the top 25% for 
the period from the beginning of the VIX series in 1990 until 2008. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
    All BHCs   Public BHCs 
  Obs. Mean Median  Obs. Mean Median 
Total loans        
 High VIX 193 -1.55 -1.39  193 -1.60 -1.44 
 Low VIX 369 -1.00 -0.93  369 -0.98 -0.87 
 Difference  -0.55*** -0.46***   -0.62*** -0.57*** 
C&I loans        
 High VIX 204 -1.73 -1.69  204 -1.83 -1.90 
 Low VIX 358 -0.91 -0.83  358 -1.15 -0.92 
 Difference  -0.82** -0.87***   -0.69** -0.98** 
Real estate loans        
 High VIX 186 -1.71 -1.69  184 -1.69 -1.63 
 Low VIX 376 -0.99 -0.81  378 -0.90 -0.87 
 Difference  -0.72*** -0.88***   -0.79*** -0.76*** 
Residential mortgages        
 High VIX 183 -0.73 -0.55  183 -0.52 -0.29 
 Low VIX 379 0.11 0.15  379 0.32 0.36 
 Difference  -0.84** -0.70*   -0.84** -0.64* 
Consumer loans        
 High VIX 194 0.70 0.52  194 0.66 0.34 
 Low VIX 368 -0.1 0.27  368 -0.11 0.39 
 Difference  0.80* 0.24   0.77* -0.05 
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Table 8. Lending by Dealer Banks at High Uncertainty Periods: Multivariate Analysis	  
This table shows estimates of the OLS regressions with quarterly growth rate in loan balances as dependent variable. 
The sample period is 1996–2008. High VIX is an indicator for the quarters in which average for the quarter daily 
VIX is in the top 25% for the period from the beginning of the VIX series in 1990 until 2008. Dealer is an indicator 
variable for banks that established Section 20 subsidiaries before 1995. Deposits, % are deposits expressed as a 
percentage of total assets. Credit Losses, % are charge-offs on loans expressed as a percentage of total loans on 
bank’s balance sheet. Tier 1 Capital, % is the amount of Tier 1 capital scaled by risk-weighted assets. ***, ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. p-values based on heteroskedasticity-
adjusted standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
  All BHCs   Public BHCs 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
High VIX -0.30*** -0.33***  -0.19*** -0.27*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000) 
High VIX * dealer -0.58** -0.60**  -0.62** -0.68** 
 (0.040) (0.030)  (0.033) (0.015) 
Dealer -0.50***   0.40**  
 (0.005)   (0.038)  
Log (total assets) -0.13*** -1.82***  -0.44*** -1.86*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposits, % -0.003 -0.01**  -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (0.128) (0.014)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit losses, % -1.33*** -2.09***  -2.69*** -2.71*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Tier 1 Capital, % -0.0004 -0.0001  -0.05*** -0.10*** 
 (0.285) (0.420)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed effect No Yes  No Yes 
Observations 72,631 72,631  18,849 18,849 
R squared 0.013 0.216   0.048 0.246 
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Table 9. Lending by Dealer Banks: Recessions and Funding Type	  
This table shows estimates of the OLS regressions with quarterly growth rate in loan balances (in %) as dependent 
variable. The sample includes public BHCs only. The sample period is 1996–2008. High VIX is an indicator variable 
for the quarters when the level of VIX was in the top 25% for the period from the beginning of the VIX series in 
1990 until 2008. NBER Recession is an indicator for Q2-Q4, 2001 and Q1-Q4, 2008. Dealer is an indicator variable 
for banks that established Section 20 subsidiaries as of the end of the second quarter of 1995. Deposits, % are 
deposits expressed as a percentage of total assets. Nondeposit Borrowing, % is the amount of non-deposit borrowing 
by a bank scaled by the total assets. Credit Losses, % are charge-offs on loans expressed as a percentage of total 
loans on bank’s balance sheet. Tier 1 Capital, % is the amount of Tier 1 capital scaled by risk-weighted assets. ***, 
** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. p-values based on 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted  standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
High VIX -0.27*** -0.17*** -0.58 -0.35*** 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.215) (0.000) 
NBER recession  -0.35***   
  (0.000)   
High VIX * dealer -0.68** -0.65** -0.57* -0.71** 
 (0.015) (0.036) (0.071) (0.013) 
NBER recession * dealer  -0.17   
  (0.674)   
Deposits, % -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03***  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
High VIX * deposits   0.00  
   (0.491)  
Nondeposit borrowing, %    0.08*** 
    (0.000) 
High VIX * nondeposit borrowing    0.01 
    (0.468) 
Log (total assets) -1.86*** -1.80*** -1.87*** -1.97*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit losses, % -2.71*** -2.63*** -2.70*** -2.68*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tier 1 capital, % -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.08*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 18,849 18,849 18,849 18,767 
R squared 0.246 0.247 0.246 0.253 
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Table 10. Which types of borrowers get reduction in credit availability? 
Panel A shows estimates of the linear probability models and probit models with the dependent variable equal to one 
if a mortgage application is denied by a bank and to zero if the loan is granted. Sample includes only public bank 
holding companies and covers one year before and after the regulatory change of July 1996 (1995 and 1997). Post 
1996 is an indicator variable for 1997, the year after the regulatory change. Dealer is an indicator variable for banks 
that established Section 20 subsidiaries before 1995. Log (Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of the applicant’s 
income. Credit Losses, % are charge-offs on loans expressed as a percentage of total loans on bank’s balance sheet. 
Median Income is the logarithm of the median household income in a county. Education is the percentage of 
population in the county with high school being the highest level of education. Minorities is the percentage of non-
white population in a county. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. p-values based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted and clustered by census tract standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. 
Panel A. Probability of Mortgage Application Denial (borrowers with high income)  
  LINEAR PROBABILITY   PROBIT 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
        
Dealer -0.15 -0.14  0.18*** 0.19*** -0.13 -0.20 
 (0.982) (0.981)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.499) (0.279) 
Post 1996 -0.01** -0.01**  0.12*** 0.09*** -0.05 -0.05 
 (0.027) (0.023)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.132) (0.130) 
Post 1996 * dealer 0.04*** 0.04***  -0.06 -0.08** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.123) (0.022) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (income) -0.05*** -0.05***  -0.38*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.32*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (total Assets) 0.08*** 0.07***  0.04*** 0.04*** 0.34*** 0.29*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
Deposits, % 0.36*** 0.35***  -1.19*** -1.19*** 1.91*** 1.89*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit Losses, % -0.06*** -0.06***  -0.21*** -0.16*** -0.24*** -0.24*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(Median Income)  -0.06***   -0.22***  -0.26*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Education  0.00**   0.03***  0.01*** 
  (0.013)   (0.000)  (0.001) 
Minorities  -0.00   -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.315)   (0.614)  (0.659) 
Fixed effects Yes  Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 468,793 468,793  468,793 468,793 468,056 468,056 
R squared 0.090 0.092   0.0515 0.0616 0.109 0.112 
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Panel B. Probability of Mortgage Application Denial (borrowers with low income)  
  LINEAR PROBABILITY   PROBIT 
 (1) (2)   (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dealer 0.17 0.17  0.22*** 0.22*** 0.54 0.61* 
 (0.999) (0.997)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.105) (0.071) 
Post 1996 0.03*** 0.03***  0.26*** 0.24*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Post 1996 * dealer 0.08*** 0.08***  0.26*** 0.20*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (income) -0.20*** -0.20***  -0.77*** -0.72*** -0.63*** -0.62*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log (total assets) -0.03 -0.03  -0.01 -0.00 -0.08 -0.08 
 (0.289) (0.299)  (0.405) (0.724) (0.271) (0.293) 
Deposits, % 0.67*** 0.68***  -1.63*** -1.51*** 2.16*** 2.20*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Credit Losses, % -0.06*** -0.06***  -0.71*** -0.64*** -0.22*** -0.22*** 
 (0.006) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) 
Log(Median Income)  0.02   -0.21***  0.07 
  (0.247)   (0.002)  (0.237) 
Education  0.00***   0.02***  0.01*** 
  (0.002)   (0.000)  (0.001) 
Minorities  0.00*   -0.00  0.00** 
  (0.084)   (0.581)  (0.040) 
Fixed effects Yes Yes  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 447,189 447,189  447,189 447,189 447,105 447,105 
R squared 0.226 0.227   0.106 0.113 0.183 0.183 
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